Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Paratactic analysis, philosophy: the attempt to analyze a compound sentence by juxtaposing the complete sentences derived from it. E.g. the earth rotates. Galileo said that. With this, problems with the attribution of propositional attitudes or indirect speech should be avoided. See also propositions, propositional attitudes, quotation, opacity, all that he said is true._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Brian Loar on Paratactic Analysis - Dictionary of Arguments
II 147ff Paratactic analysis/Davidson: 1. avoids problems of the logical form of sentences with propositional attitudes - (purely significant position/not purely) 2. propositional attitudes no longer refer to intensional entities "The earth moves" is simply both times a meaningful expression. No reference to meaning. LoarVsDavidson: but this can be true only if there is something substantial behind it. KripkeVsVs: E.g. measuring: relates an object onto another, the standard meter. But if there were no standard meter, the object would still have a length. LoarVs: but that does not go for the meaning theory. - Thesis: therefore it is necessary to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory. >Meaning theory, >Intensional objects._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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> Counter arguments against Loar
> Counter arguments in relation to Paratactic Analysis
